India’s
response to Mumbai 26/11 attacks has been nothing more than whining and
complaining as a hapless victim which neither deters future attacks nor does it
inspire confidence in her own security apparatus.
Karan Kharb
Mumbai 26/11
was an aggression that had all the ingredients of a ‘covert military operation’
innovatively planned, meticulously coordinated and audaciously executed through
un-uniformed Pakistani ‘soldiers’ – call them mercenaries if euphemism be
so necessary for those un-enrolled combatants trained and motivated under the
aegis of Pakistan Army, Navy and ISI. Quite understandably, it comforts
Pakistan to disown these ‘soldiers’ and label them as ‘non-state actors’
absolving itself of any involvement in the anti-India crusade. Pakistan’s mask
of innocence has, however, been ripped off by confessions made by Kassab – the
pawn in the forefront on 26 November 2008 and other irrefutable evidence
already aplenty. More revelations from David Headley and Rana picked up by the
FBI in the US have added more substance to it. If more was still needed, it is
now overflowing from Syed Zabiuddin Ansari alias Abu Jundal whose depositions
have now exposed how the entire operation was being remotely guided and
controlled from the ‘Control Room’ in Karachi.
Somehow,
India’s response has been embarrassingly feeble despite overwhelming evidence.
We started by sending lists of Pakistani individuals identified as culprits in
the episode to the Pakistan Government and quite naively expected them to
punish them. On which principles of statecraft do we expect that the Pakistan
Government (read ‘Army’) would ever admit its complicity in the crime and proceed
against those it hired, trained and sent to do what they did? ‘Patriots all,
they deserved highest of the awards on earth and zannat in the heavens’
- that’s how their masters in Karachi and Islamabad would seem to think. Little
wonder that every piece of evidence supplied by India has been trashed by
Pakistan. Surely, there must be better ways to deal with aggressions like
these.
Every
sovereign state is entitled to defend itself against all kinds of aggression or
inimical actions with all its might. India too must act in a manner that Pakistan
is made to genuinely believe that the retaliation to any misadventure originating
from her territory would be sure, swift and severe. Look how we have decimated
our own credibility in the recent past. After the attack on our Parliament in
December 2001, the Army was mobilised and deployed all along Indo-Pak border –
but only to return home empty handed after nearly a year of un-fought Op
Parakram. Registering our protest against Pak sponsored terror attacks, we have
frequently disrupted the summit meetings and Samjhauta bus service only to
resume again without extracting much from our protests. We have created enough precedence on the
basis of which India’s response to future such attacks can be foreseen and predicted.
The world,
however, has better models and precedents to go by in dealing with such hostile
acts by rogue states. Israel, for example, has developed her model of credible
deterrence and frequently demonstrated her resolve through severest
counter-blows to the originators of crime, no matter where they hid. Fear of
hostile international opinion has not discouraged her bold initiatives and in
preserving her sovereignty Israel has never shied away from delivering crippling
blows often to the consternation of even her trusted ally, the United States. Now, compare ‘Operation Entebbe’ with India’s response
to India’s shameful ‘Operation Kandahar’ in December 1999.
Another
model is the United States of America. Whole world watched how the US responded
to the al Qaeda terror attack on her vital installations on 11 September 2001.
The US carried the war to the land from where it had originated and not only wrested
Afghanistan from al Qaeda-Taliban clutches but continued the pursuit until
Osama bin Laden was raided and killed in his den deep inside Pakistan. China,
Russia, France, Germany, UK and many others have often carried out swift
surgical operations by mobilising their Special Forces and striking cross
border targets leaving the harbouring country under awe. Even countries like
North Korea and South Africa have clearly defined and unambiguously declared
policies which have been reinforced by their actions. India too has a highly trained set up of
Special Forces with capabilities to swiftly move and strike anywhere across the
globe. What we do not yet have is an unambiguous national policy to deal with
acts of terror and covert attacks like Mumbai, Red Fort, Parliament et al.
The
Pak doctrine of covert military operations is not new. It dates back to 1948 and has been resorted
to nearly in all conflicts between the two neighbours since then. What could be
more shocking than the fact that Pakistani soldiers were infiltrating in the
guise of local shepherds to occupy heights in Kargil at a time when the two
Prime Ministers, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif, were signing the Lahore Declaration in
Feb 1999 promising to find solutions to problems through peaceful means with mutual
cooperation. The Indian Army had to
fight a limited war and sacrificed precious lives to beat back this military
adventurism of Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif is on record having admitted that he was
kept in the darkness by his Army Chief, Gen Parvez Musharraf and the Army’s
Kargil misadventure did not have his Government’s approval. Going by the
post-Mumbai official posturing, how ridiculous would it seem if India were to
despatch nominal roll and proofs of the Pakistani soldiers killed at Batalik,
Tiger Hill and other Kargil heights requiring their commanders including Gen
Parvez Musharraf to be prosecuted for their misdeeds?
If
the Army could ignore their Prime Minister in 1999, the Pak Government is in far
worse disarray today and, therefore, there is every likelihood of the Army/ISI
having acted on their own in planning and deciding Mumbai 26/11. Remember
President Zardari had offered to send the ISI Chief to Delhi soon after the
Mumbai attacks. Next morning he was over ruled by the Army Chief, Gen Ashfaq
Parvez Kayani who said there was no question of the ISI Chief or any other
official going to Delhi to assist in investigations or give clarifications. Imagine
a Government having to maintain its sober countenance with such an over assertive
and insolent Army on one side, hard-core Islamists and pro-Taliban maulvis on
the other, and a hyper-active Supreme Court gunning for the President from the
top. Logically prudence suggests that while meaningful negotiations would run
through complexities in such a chaotic environment, lightning commando strikes
on pre-selected targets like the ‘Control Room’ complex in Karachi and Terrorist
training camps deep inside Pakistan could have achieved better results with
stunning effect.
Sadly, however, India’s response to
Mumbai 26/11 attacks has been nothing more than whining and complaining as a
hapless victim which neither deters future attacks nor does it inspire
confidence in her own security apparatus. Anyway, the time and
opportunity for quick and meaningful retaliation has been lost long ago. Asking
and expecting the Pak Government to prosecute Pak citizens found involved in the
Mumbai attacks is too much. But not all is over yet. At this belated stage too,
India can still proceed decisively in a manner that would display her resolve
and competence to deal with the guilty – be it the state or individuals –
effectively. There
is an immediate need for India’s top politico-bureaucratic policy makers to make
themselves abreast with the capabilities and limitations of the Armed Forces
and other security agencies. Integrating them in the process of decision
making, planning future safeguards, pre-empting enemy plans and delivering a
swift and decisive retaliatory blow in the event of any future attack can go a
long way not only in fine-tuning our response system but also in building up
our credibility as an emerging global power.
Likewise, even as we move ahead in the now-on now-off Indo-Pak
confidence building parleys, it is strategically vital to introduce there an
implicit suspicion – rather, belief – that India can choose any means of
reprisal to avenge any recurrence of Pak exported or assisted attack. Alongside, Pakistan must also be made to
visualise two aspects very clearly: One, Pakistan stands to gain far more from peace,
friendship and cooperation with India in revitalising her economy through trade
agreements and cheaper transit costs. Two, her policy of unleashing terrorism on
India will hereafter become dangerously disadvantageous and highly unaffordable
to it. These two aspects should be highlighted and projected to Pakistan and
the world in absolute unambiguous terms sooner than later.
