Karan Kharb
The Army is the principal arm of our
military might. With a strength of 11.77 lakh personnel on active list, it
ranks second largest in the world after the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of
China. More importantly, the Indian Army
distinguishes itself from the rest of the world armies on many counts. Firstly, in the post-World War II era, India's
victory in the 1971 Indo-Pak war was the most decisive victory that created an
independent sovereign nation – Bangladesh. The surrender of 93,000 strong
Pakistan Army in Dhaka was also a unique historic event in the modern world. Secondly, deployed at the Saltoro-Siachen complex,
world's highest battlefield with heights
ranging from 18,000 to 25,0000 feet above mean sea level and the sub-zero
temperature as low as –50° Celsius, the Indian soldiers have beaten back numerous
attacks launched by the Pakistan Army to snatch these strategic heights from
India since 1984. Thirdly, despite having fought five wars and endless cross border
skirmishes, troops remain actively deployed in counter-insurgency and
counter-terrorist operations in as varied environments as humid forests of the
Northeast, hilly forests, valleys and icy mountains of Jammu and Kashmir in the
north.
Relentless Commitment
Nowhere in the developed world are
armies physically deployed to protect borders as in the case of India. Here the
army remains deployed and actively engaged along most part of the great Himalayas
along the 4,056 km long Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China and 2740 km long
border with Pakistan from Pt NJ 4982 in the north to the point where Sir Creek
meets the Arabian Sea including 740 km Line of Control (LoC) in J&K. There
have been intermittent battles and localised wars along this line in the past
and the cross border firing has hardly ever ceased. After years of sustained
counter insurgency operations in the Northeast, some stability has been
achieved but thanks to the porous borders and underdeveloped woody terrain, the
region affords safer escape and support routes to and from Myanmar, Bangladesh,
Bhutan, Nepal and China. Influx of illegal migrants from Bangladesh has altered
the demography of Assam adding another dimension to the insurgency in the region.
Deeper in the hinterland, the Maoist insurgency has already spread to a number
of states forming what has come to be called a 'Red Corridor' connecting
underdeveloped areas from Nepal to Karnataka and beyond.
It hardly needs any elaboration that
the Army has remained committed in the interior parts of Jammu and Kashmir fighting
Pakistan sponsored proxy war that has frequently hit cities and towns considered
safer being far away from the borders. Audacious
terror attacks have often surprised the authorities and the masses in the
serene environs of heartland India from time to time. Vital institutions and
establishments like the Parliament, Red Fort, Akshar Dham temple at Gandhinagar,
Taj Hotel in Mumbai and so on have been audaciously targeted in the past. Enhanced threat perception and probability of
such attacks impose heavy responsibility on the army units and formations even
in peace stations.
It is common for the army units to swap
roles every two-three years from plains to mountains; from the high mountains
of Arunachal to the marshlands of Kutch; from the glacial north to the jungles
of Nagaland; from the clammy jungles to the sand dunes of Jaisalmer. Diversity
of operational environments, unpredictable time and spot of crises and fleeting
nature of near invisible enemy have kept the Indian Army on the toes even in
peace locations. On its flipside, nevertheless, there is an advantage of this
24x7 involvement. Every crisis throws up new challenges and more lessons. This
abundance of experience has enriched the Indian Army professionally so well
that doctrines and operational techniques conceptualised by the Indian military
brains have been adopted by many other armies, especially those operating
alongside Indian units in the UN peacekeeping missions.
Charting a New Course
The Prime Minister, the national
security establishment and foreign policy advisors in his government are a team
of competent experts who could evolve effective strategies to foster relations
and to assert India's legitimate role in South Asia and beyond. In the new age
relations, India will require credible military muscle to protect its economic,
commercial and political interests in the region. Narendra Modi's aura as a connective and
assertive leader with vision should inspire the policy makers in New Delhi to
blend India's Hard Power into Soft Power so as to evolve 'Smart Power' that
would not be coercive but powerfully persuasive; not offensive but effectively
protective; not competitive but cooperative; not hegemonic but accommodating to
harmonise with the Prime Minister's declared policy of 'Make in India'.
Even as the Indian Army has been so
continually deployed in multifarious roles, its enormous potential has remained
captive within India's land borders except, to a limited extent, its role in
the UN peacekeeping missions. The world is changing fast. New matrices of power
are emerging in which the two Asian nuclear giants and economic powers – India
and China – are going to play roles that would reshape relations and equations
regionally and globally. Their rise emits a mixture of hopes, expectations and
apprehensions in the region. The emerging scenario thus puts new demands on the
Army to be prepared for bigger military roles beyond its areas of present
engagements. Whereas the Navy and Air
Force can adapt to this altered and enhanced role sooner if their projected
equipment and organisational requirements are effectively met, the Army would
need the proxy war and border scenario altered to be of value in strategic
power projection beyond borders.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi's
blitzkrieg of diplomatic touring abroad has evoked enormous interest throughout
the world. He started from day one by inviting the heads of SAARC nations to
his oath taking ceremony. His thrust on the foreign policy and closer
cooperation with neighbours in South Asia and East Asia has evoked great
interest among most countries in the region even as some have failed to hide
their envy and apprehensions at India's emerging role in this part of the
world. It is quite obvious that India's expanding commerce and closer relations
with countries not in Chinese good books shall be contested in many ways.
Pakistan is already apprehensive of India's growing clout with the US vis-à-vis
its role in Afghanistan.
To nourish diplomatic and economic
relations in South Asia and Asia Pacific, India will need to develop its
military into a credible power to protect and promote its national interests in
the region. Even as the Navy needs more
urgent and extensive development, the Army will need strategic reorientation
and urgent modernisation that has been pending for years. The tri-service A&N
Command already has Army units integrated into it. Creation of marine army
formations and enhancing of amphibious capabilities will be prerequisites for
power projection across blue seas.
Army units, formations and commanders
at all levels have remained preoccupied with proxy war situations in the
Kashmir Valley, insurgency in the Northeast, an ever-burning LoC and with the PLA
troops lurking along the LAC. To break out for a larger role in the Asian/South
Asian region, the Army will have to look beyond borders and chart its new
course in consonance with the Government's foreign policy and national
objectives. India needs to settle issues with Pakistan and China to ensure safe
and intact borders between neighbours. A by-product of our border settlement and
improved relations with China could be a positive influence on Pakistan. In the
event of India and China resolving their issues and transforming the LAC into a
mutually accepted international border, Pakistan should be expected to come to
terms with the new realities and sign up with India. To many in India and
Pakistan such a hope might appear far-fetched today but Pakistan, already a
victim of multi-pronged anarchy, cannot afford to be pushed into
isolation.
Strategic disengagement of the Army
from the borders and inner commitments will enable the Army Headquarters to
plan and conduct programmes for strategic reorientation, structural reorganisation
wherever needed and expeditious modernisation. Already, India is one of the
frontrunners in subscribing Army contingents to the UN peacekeeping missions. Select
teams and units have been carrying out joint exercises with the Armies of a
number of other countries including China. An army trained and equipped with
the appropriate arms and equipment, poised to execute missions of national
interest abroad shall be a natural deterrent for mischief mongers closer home.
Shed Inertia, Synergise Action
Unfortunately, this abundance of
unique military potential that could have been harnessed to strategize foreign
relations and promote national interests has been dissipated by a convention of
politico-bureaucratic inertia which has steadfastly kept the Army not only out
of the strategic decision making process but also neglecting to maintain its
war worthiness. This weird legacy of
keeping the Army at arm's length is rooted in Pundit Jawahal Lal Nehru's penchant
for building up India as a peace-loving nation on the principle of Panchsheel
and non-violence. He viewed Army as a symbol of violence. Thankfully, the
Chinese aggression of 1962 jolted him. Krishna
Menon who was Nehru's Defence Minister, like his mentor, also preferred to give
more credence to the bureaucrats around him rather than the Army Chief even on
matters of military significance. The
anti-Army stance of India's first generation political leadership emboldened
the bureaucracy to usurp authority pushing the Services Headquarters further
away. Despite recommendations by a number of study groups and committees
constituted by the Government, no significant improvement has taken place. Nothing is 'integrated' in the 'Integrated
Headquarters of MoD (Army)'. The Army Headquarters functions in the same manner
as ever before.
Nevertheless, Prime Minister Narendra
Modi's visits to Siachen Glacier and other forward areas in J&K have
kindled the hope for some far-reaching policy decisions. The Prime Minister's
global vision is different. No longer restricted by the set-piece policies and
options, his approach has the markings of a sagacious strategist who has the
capacity chalk out a new course for India's march into the future. He is aware
of the value of military power in such a journey and seems inclined to take
Army, Navy and Air Force along in his quest to carve out a niche of power and
prestige for India in the comity of nations. The arrival of Manohar Parrikar as
the new Defence Minister also signals expeditious changes and far-reaching improvements
including organisational restructuring of the Ministry of Defence.
The modernisation programme of the
Army has suffered badly in the last 5-6 years.
During this period, a large number of sources of defence procurement –
manufacturers and suppliers – were black listed. There being hardly any
indigenous military equipment manufacturing, this retrograde action left the
Army bereft of critical equipment and accessories for years to come. Black listing has now been reviewed and revoked
in many cases. Making up deficiencies of equipment will be, however, just one positive
action in the system that requires extensive overhauling. Of the two critical deficiencies – morale and
material – the deficiency of arms and equipment has rightly caught the attention
of the Government and appropriate actions seem to have been initiated.
Match up 'Morale' to Modi's Global Quest
The most critical deficiency – the
deficiency of MORALE – is yet to be addressed appropriately. There are reasons for it. The Government is unaware of this deficiency
because no Army Chief has ever admitted lack of courage and morale in
his Force leave alone reporting it to the Government. Traditionally, admission of 'low morale' carries
a stigma no soldier can bear. It is like admitting defeat and running away like
a coward. That's unsoldierly! Even on deathbed, no soldier will ever admit his
falling spirits. For the commanders, falling morale in command is a direct
reflection on his leadership. Yet, while
high morale can compensate material deficiency to a large extend, no amount of
material abundance can compensate the deficiency of morale – the primary battle
winning factor for any army. Therefore,
the level of morale has to be gauged from the conduct and performance of men and
units under stress. In the Indian Army, it has manifested through the rising
trend of suicides, insubordination and fratricide, mutinous affront in units and
reluctance of the youth to join Army as a career. As revealed by the Defence
Minister recently on the floor of the Lok Sabha, as many as 362 soldiers have
committed suicide since 2011 and the trend is rising every year. Giving more details
in the current session of the Lok Sabha, the Defence Minister revealed that the
Army was short of 7,989 officers and what should alarm all Indians, the major
shortfall (7,764) was at the level of fighting leaders – Lt Cols, Majors,
Captains and Lieutenants. Infantry
units, the cutting edge of the Army, are making do with only 11-12 officers
against an authorised strength of 21. That means that officers at unit level
are shouldering responsibilities twice their share!
Intriguingly, factors such as socio-economic
changes, smart phones and easy connectivity, enhanced awareness among troops
and their families are being cited as 'causes' of suicides, insubordination and
rebellious occurrences. Nothing could be
more humiliating and widely off the mark because the suggestion implied within
such assumptions indicates official disapproval of social progress and the
principle of natural growth. If education and societal development were a cause
of the problem, would the modern Indian Army be happy enrolling school drop
outs and homeless vagabonds instead of the educated, able bodied youth aspiring
for a better future for self and family? Factors cited above as causes for the
decay are in reality the tools of excellence that could only catalyse
collective excellence in any team and organisation. The Army leadership has
perhaps erred in perceiving the problem in its correct perspective. Dispassionate
analysis of the situation and environments might throw up some real reasons for
the declining morale and the trust deficit in officer-men relationship.
Nothing inspires a body of troops
more than the personal example of their leader.
In the recent past, a number of poor examples have sprung up in the form
of scams like Adarsh Society and Sukhna land scams involving top brass of the
Army. Escalating rumours of bribery in equipment acquisition deals and fake
encounters are some more glaring happenings of the recent years that have
exposed the poorer side of military leadership. Observant subordinates who are
often used as pawns in such unsavoury deeds feel cheated and exploited. Further,
operating in proxy war scenario and frequently aiding the civil authorities,
the soldier finds himself working in close proximity of the civil police, administration
and politicians. It is in these environments that he observes from close
quarters all the wheeling dealing between goons, touts, criminals and the police.
The experience is disappointing for any soldier. Working with the army units of
more advanced countries in different parts of the world has also had its effect
in reshaping the traditional belief system of today's soldier. These
experiences trigger new aspirations and leave lasting impressions on soldiers
and officers.
Besides the spate of scams and court
martial trials of some very senior army officers in the last five years, a
large number of senior generals including at least one Army Chief were seen
going to the court for personal gains. Even as they were all legally entitled
to seek redress of their grievances, it only buttressed the growing belief
among the subordinates that it is the self-interest and not virtues like
altruism that spurs today's military leaders. This is a dangerous notion that
cannot be allowed to grow and needs to be immediately reversed.
Besides the bureaucratic apathy and
red tape, self-centric preoccupation of the top Army brass in the recent past
has only facilitated the official neglect, which kept the fighting units waiting
for essential equipment and accessories for years in the face of worsening
security scenario in the country. Infantry units are still using weapons and
sights of 1960s vintage. Induction of Arjun II MBT is further delayed for want
of requisite missile system and tanks in service are mostly night blind for
want of next generation night sights. No new generation gun has been added to
the ageing Artillery since the mid 1980s when induction of Bofors made news for
wrong reasons. Such critical
deficiencies also have had a telling effect on morale of the fighting units. When
critical demands of essential equipment remain unmet for a long time, trust between
the leader and his command takes a hit because subordinates attribute such lingering
deficiencies to the incompetence of their leaders.
Thankfully, the DAC has lately cleared
acquisition of 8,000 anti-tank missiles (Spike ATGM), 300 launchers and 360
Armoured Personnel Carriers against long outstanding demands of the Army. The
DAC under the chairmanship of Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar has also cleared
acquisition of 814 artillery guns. In its quest to attain self-reliance in
defence production, the Modi Sarkar has enunciated its policy of 'Make in
India' under which most of the acquisition shall be on terms of technology
transfer. For instance, only a hundred of the 814 artillery guns shall be
purchased off the shelf. The rest 714
shall be manufactured in India.
To rise and match up to the Prime
Minister Modi's vision of future India, the Indian Army will have reinvent itself
culturally, conceptually and structurally to break free from outdated dogmas in
the name of traditions. The Army Chief
must communicate directly with the political leadership so as to iron out
misgivings if any and to educate the latter about the capabilities, limitations
and requirements of the Army. Times are now ripe for evolving and firming up
this process to integrate the Army as a co-axial component of India's foreign
policy. Undoubtedly, speedy
modernisation of the Army is of paramount importance. At the same time, ignoring the man behind the
machine could negate all the advantages of modernisation.
(Acknowledgement: This article was published in Geopolitics magazine (Jan 2015))