Siachen: Track II Unexplained
(Courtesy - Indian Defence Review)
A recent article in a
prominent Indian daily last week talked of non-state actors who bring nations
closer and the Ottawa Dialogue; the now well known issue of ‘Demilitarization
of Siachen’. This has been promptly put on a blog by participants of Track II
saying “Track II Explained”. But this can hardly be end of the story. There is
plenty that is ‘unexplained’ about this particular Track II.
There is no doubt that Track II processes have
their relevance and they do have government level interaction, briefings and
debriefings.
Much has happened since
the India-Pakistan Track II agreed to a proposal to ‘Demilitarize Siachen’ in
September 2012 and the press release by the Atlantic Council of Ottawa hit the
web on 02 October 2012. Acquiescence by the Indian members of the Track II to
withdraw from Siachen was naturally met with amazement and shock in India.
Prior to this agreement of the Track II at Lahore in September last, articles
and TV discussions came up portraying that Siachen was strategically
irrelevant. The government chose to remain tight lipped and continues with that
stance albeit in the aftermath of furore post the Atlantic Council of Ottawa
press release, a panel consisting of two members of the Track II Team under a
former Ambassador and Secretary MEA (who had nothing to do with the Track II
Team but is known to be close to the political hierarchy) made efforts to
justify withdrawal from Siachen at India International Centre but were shocked
at the unanimous opposition from the audience including from a former Army
Chief and journalists. Why this former Ambassador and Secretary MEA tried to
justify the proposed withdrawal from Siachen and on whose instructions remains
a mystery.
There is no doubt that
Track II processes have their relevance and they do have government level
interaction, briefings and debriefings. To this end, they do provide
significant inputs that facilitate the Track I dialogue while not being binding
on the latter. This is an accepted norm. Track II dialogues can also be at
multiple levels, even simultaneously. However, this particular Track II
agreement raises several questions that require clarifications and
transparency.
Interaction with the
participants reveals that none of them is aware as to how they were selected,
who sponsored them and who the Indian coordinator was. The Co-Chair described
the status of the Track II Team as a “Private Body”, later changed to “Group of
Private Individuals” over whom he had no control. Significantly, Indian members
of the Track II Team comprised eight former Indian Military officers out of the
total eleven members. While the meetings were held over a period of months, one
member stated in an article that for once the bureaucrat members were in the
backseat and the former military members in the forefront. Surprisingly,
not one of the former eight military officers had served in Siachen and the
team made no effort to visit the area under discussion despite months of
parleys. This raises a question mark on the motive of the Indian coordinator
who gave these names to Atlantic Council of Ottawa. Was it by design?
Surprisingly, not one of the former eight
military officers had served in Siachen and the team made no effort to visit
the area under discussion despite months of parleys.
The Indian Co-Chair of
the Track II Team maintains that the MEA briefing made no mention of Siachen
and no questions were asked by any members with regard to Siachen. The logic
being given is that the Track II Team took upon themselves to work out “HOW”
Siachen can be demilitarized without going into “WHY” and “WHEN”, which is
laughable. Forget net assessment, every young military officers know how a
military appreciation is done, what its nuances are and what factors need to be
considered to arrive at the logical course of action.
The logic, therefore,
can hardly be bought; a body of “Private Individuals” working out without any
higher direction whatsoever ‘HOW” Siachen should be demilitarized. Who was the
driving force in this body of private individuals on which the Co-Chair admits
he had no control and what was the motivation? What are the participants
hiding? Why has the Indian Co-Chair clammed up and refusing to take any
questions? Additionally, if only “HOW” was being looked at then vital issues
like Pakistan sponsored terrorism and the China factor were obviously not
discussed or discussed in most perfunctory manner.
The press release by
Atlantic Council of Ottawa is totally silent on China. Terrorism is supposedly
discussed but was it discussed in relation to Demilitarization of Siachen –
that this will facilitate Pakistan launch Kashmir Valley like proxy war in
Ladakh with dire consequences to our national security? It is not without
reason that Musharraf had declared “There will be many more Kargils”.
The vehemence with which
the participants were articulating that Siachen has no worthwhile strategic
significance has blown off with the wind especially after the anger faced
during the hurriedly organized panel discussion at the India International
Centre in early October 2012. Participants now admit individually that Siachen
(read Saltoro Ridge) indeed has great strategic significance, admitting this
even in interactions with military wings of political parties post the public
furore. What then was the motivation for our Track II Team to ignore the
strategic significance of the Saltoro Ridge particularly with China sitting in
our territory in Shaksgam Valley and Aksai Chin and Pakistani and US media
indicating Pakistan is leasing out Gilgit-Baltistan region to China for 50
years, plus the fact that withdrawal from Saltoro would open the floodgates of
infiltration into Ladakh by Pakistan’s state sponsored non-state actors.
Why was the Track II Team ignoring the reality of
the strategic significance of Siachen? Why was the advice of every former Army
Chief and the present one that India should not withdraw from Siachen ignored?
A former military
officer cum journalist participant even as late as 12 April 2012 was
passionately vindicating India’s right to hold on to Siachen on national TV;
that India should never withdraw from Siachen because of its strategic
significance. What happened in just five months to make him do a 180 degrees
turn. Why was the Track II Team ignoring the reality of the strategic
significance of Siachen? Why was the advice of every former Army Chief and the
present one that India should not withdraw from Siachen ignored? What was the
role of the Indian coordinator and his mentors in making the Track II Team
adopt such stance? What are the participants hiding?
Musharraf admits in his
autobiography that India pre-empted the occupation of Saltoro Ridge by Pakistan
– Pakistan’s planned move was obviously for strategic reasons and not to
establish a winter retreat. The fact that Pakistan launched the Kargil
intrusions to cut off and grab Siachen has been pooh-poohed by many in India.
Now Lieutenant General, Shahid Aziz, former Corps Commander of Lahore recently
wrote about Kargil in his blog saying, “The whole truth about Kargil is yet to
be known….. It was a total disaster….. We didn’t pre-empt anything; nothing was
on the cards. I was then heading the Analysis Wing of Inter Services
Intelligence ……Our clearly expressed intent was to cut the supply line to
Siachen and force the Indians to pull out…… There were no mujahideen, only
taped wireless messages, which fooled no one. Our soldiers ……… the boys were
comforted by their commander’s assessment that no serious response would come….
Cut off and forsaken, our posts started collapsing one after the other, though
the General (Musharraf) publicly denied it.”
Here, the fact that the
Track II agreement is only a proposal and not binding on Track I is not the
issue. That Pakistan considers its high powered Track II Team as good as Track
I is also not the issue. The issue is that for eternity, Pakistan will quote
this military heavy Indian Track II having agreed to withdraw from Siachen.
More significantly, this can also be exploited by the politician-bureaucrat
mafia within India that is working at cross purposes to India’s national
interests. Why are we calling slimy Musharraf time and again for leadership
summits when he is a fugitive in his own country and has been stabbing us
repeatedly? Why are the anti-India Hurriyat members given access to the
Pakistani Embassy including every time some Pakistani official comes to Delhi?
Why is the this bunch given visas to go and meet the mullah-terrorist Hafiz
Saeed when India has been exhorting Pakistan to indict him as the mastermind
of 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attack of 2008? Why is the IB funding the
Hurriyat, with what purpose and why without reference to the Army?
It may be recalled that the FBI caught on to
Ghulam Mohammed Fai only in 2011 after he had already pumped in some $350
millions funded by the ISI into US over several years for moulding perceptions
in Pakistan’s favour with regard to Kashmir.
Why is the Centre mute
to anti-India activities in states, one example being total inaction on
non-bailable warrants issued against Akbaruddin Owaisi way back in 2009? Why
has the government been fooling the public since 2010 saying the Maoist
insurgency will be over in two-three years? Coming back to Siachen, why such a
decision was taken by the Indian members of the Track II Team and with what
motivation remains a question mark.
As per the Atlantic
Council of press note, militaries of both India and Pakistan held several
rounds to boost confidence building measures, these meetings having been held
in Dubai (20-21 November 2011), Bangkok (23-25 February 2012) and Lahore (23-25
September 2012) and that additionally, working group meetings took place in
Chiang Mai (21 April 2012) and Palo Alto (30-31 July 2012). These were followed
by the meeting in question in Lahore on 23-25 September 2012. Given the five
star culture of such meetings, the expenditure involved would have been
enormous. Were the decisions of the participants influenced advertently or
inadvertently?
It may be recalled that
the FBI caught on to Ghulam Mohammed Fai only in 2011 after he had already
pumped in some $350 millions funded by the ISI into US over several years for
moulding perceptions in Pakistan’s favour with regard to Kashmir. Obviously,
ISI would have transferred such funds through several fronts and not directly.
In the instant case of the Track II, an agreement to withdraw from Siachen
without any governmental direction to the effect (as maintained by
participants) and in direct contrast to military advice not to demilitarize
raises serious questions. Silence and lack of transparency only reinforce
apprehensions.
What exactly has
Pakistan done to deserve this largesse – killing and threatening Panchayat
members in J&K, failing to punish perpetrators of 26/11 Mumbai terrorist
attack, continuing its proxy war to destabilize India, arming Indian Maoists
through the LeT, blatantly denying ISI and LeT links despite solid evidence
given by David Headley in 2011, what? Hopefully, the recent barbarianism by
Pakistan at least should open the eyes of the blind men. Yet, participants of
the Track II have been harping that Demilitarization from Siachen is “doable”.
Well, so are whole of Jammu and Kashmir, Arunachal Pradesh and much more – all
doable if one is prepared to pack up one’s bags, move back and vacate our own
territory.
Silence and lack of transparency only reinforce
apprehensions.
Coming back to the Track
II, a much wider debate on the above issue is definitely warranted. To this
end, the United Services Institution of India offered its premises to the
sponsors of the Track II for holding a discussion on the issue along with the
Track II Team, giving them opportunity to also interact with a wide cross
section of scholars, diplomats, military personnel etc. However, this has been
declined by the sponsors saying “the process is well established and it would
be disruptive to change it now”. Strangely, all meeting of this Track II have
been held abroad including at Lahore in Pakistan. Was this by design to not let
the Indian public get the whiff of what was cooking?
The Indian public deserves answers including whether we have moles
in the establishment working for foreign intelligence agencies, which is not
new. An open public debate including with the sponsors and the Indian members
of the Track II Team is certainly warranted, not on a pliable TV channel but at
an autonomous Think Tank like the United Services Institution of India. While
the sponsors may shy off the suggestion, what about a wider debate within the
county minus the sponsors? Will the government at least speak up now with
Pakistan having bared her fangs?
Prakash Katoch is a former Lt Gen Special Forces,
Indian Army
No comments:
Post a Comment